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1. Introduction 1 
The survival of the ILO despite the demise of the League of Nations, and, in particular, the 
ILO’s status in the post Second World War settlement, is substantially an effect of its role in 
the interwar economic depression. In that period, the ILO became an important locus for, first, 
the professional gathering and ordering of information about the depression and its 
consequences, and, second, the international discussion of policy responses. These roles 
created sustained status and legitimacy for the ILO into the modern era.  Moreover, these 
roles emerged as the effect of conscious strategy within the leadership of the ILO, which 
positioned the ILO carefully to fill the need for international consideration of the depression.  
 
The discussion below provides an account of these roles and the strategic positioning of the 
ILO by its leadership. The discussion is in four parts; first, a discussion of the ILO and the 
depression; second, an account of the ‘Policy of Presence, initiated by Albert Thomas, and 
designed to establish the international relevance and profile of the ILO; third, the consolidation 
of the Thomas approach by subsequent ILO leaderships; fourth, the policy to simultaneously 
broaden the ILO’s social and economic agenda and engage the United States in ILO work to 
guarantee its survival. 
 
2.   The ILO and the Interwar economic depression: The Policy of ILO 
Autonomy 
As the interwar economic depression deepened, unemployment and social unrest became a 
worldwide phenomenon. Across the globe, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of 
unemployment prompted major reconsideration of economic policy settings. The scope and 
intensity of the crisis challenged the reigning economic orthodoxy For example, in Australasia, 
the ability of New Zealand and Australia to retain a firm grip on the control of their own destiny 
became increasingly fragile and there followed a shift from decades of interventionist 
experimentation to policy initiatives based upon the fostering of an export-led recovery.2 How 
economies responded to the Depression and to what extent these responses impacted on 
their ability, and willingness, to take part in any internationally coordinated recovery 
programme, occupied the research activities of fledgling international organisations such as 
the League of Nations and the ILO. 
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Countries retreated behind trade barriers to protect their own industries and in the realisation 
that neither the self-healing powers of laissez-faire nor the classic instruments of government 
interventionism seemed capable of turning the tide. The machinery of world trade ground to a 
halt as economies retreated from international co-operation and turned instead to the 
protection of their own national markets. The worldwide depression became the first ‘universal’ 
problem faced by government, business and labour since the conclusion of the First World 
War.  
 
As faith in the liberal capitalism model melted away, the crisis prompted a renewed search for 
political as well as economic alternatives. Some looked again toward the Soviet Union, which 
observed the chaos from the sidelines, its economy seemingly impervious to the slump.3 
Others, in Germany, Italy and Japan, turned to fascism and began planning the replacement of 
the old liberal system by military-led expansionism. Yet, while intellectuals of the time wrote in 
fear for the world as the aggressive expansionism of the radical Right spread into China and 
Ethiopia, politicians looked upon it as a threat that could be appeased and contained.4 They 
saw in the rise of working class power and voice and the spread of Communism a greater 
danger, one which promoted the rise of fascism in the first place and on which they found 
common ground. 
 
The United States was no less immune from this fear than countries in Europe and was keen 
to portray its workers as capitalists at heart and to persuade them of the dangers of organised 
politics. Comparing the lot of European workers with those in the United States provided, at 
least in one prominent case, a backdrop to the propaganda: 
 
Certainly some of the labor difficulties in Europe arise, at least to a degree, from that 
lack of generally practised, “understanding” collaboration between employer and 
employee such as we find so often in the United States. Our advantage is primarily due 
(as my friend John Frey, of the Federation of Labor, has put it) to the firm refusal of the 
American worker to recognise any barriers of class lines, any sharp, permanent 
segregation of privileged groups. He knows, and is proud of the fact - as are all of us - 
that the wage earner of today is the shop foreman of tomorrow, and the manager and 
perhaps plant-owner of the near future. It is mobile, dynamic industrial democracy of 
that sturdy, virile type which makes for healthy, vigorous growth in the business body of 
this Nation. European labor is much more deeply involved in organised in politics than 
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is labor in the United States. Sometimes it is organized as a political party, and that has 
not always been beneficial to the true interests of labor, since it tends to impair and 
becloud the presentation of the workers problems. The American labor movement 
today is largely free of such mingling motives as between economics and what we 
might call professional politics. Advocates of a labor party in this country should study 
carefully the consequences to the worker himself of the frequently grave political 
entanglement of labor groups in Europe.5 
 
Political consensus held that the Depression and mass unemployment offered a breeding 
ground for Communism. Speeches by politicians frequently mixed comments on the slump 
with references to the Communist threat. They pointed to the growth of the German 
Communist Party and the 85% of its membership drawn from the unemployed, while ignoring 
or downplaying the equally rapid growth of the Nazi Party.6 Communism was portrayed as the 
common enemy. Hence, guarding against the radical politicisation of the masses played a 
significant part in stimulating inter-governmental co-operation around mass unemployment.  
 
Meanwhile, in the face of economic protectionism and the growth of domestic nationalism, the 
fragile international order faltered. The League of Nations seemed increasingly incapable of 
sustaining either the order or its own legitimacy, and found itself on the point of collapse. What 
maintained the vestiges of international co-operation was the collective fear that the 
depression, and its consequent unemployment, would favour Communism . For Hobsbawm,  
 
‘Keynesians held, correctly, that the demand which the incomes of fully employed 
workers must generate, would have the most stimulating effect on depressed 
economies. Nevertheless, the reason why this means of increasing demand was given 
such urgent priority ... was that mass unemployment was believed to be politically and 
socially explosive, as indeed it proved to be ...’7 
 
If the League was now showing itself to be increasingly incapable of co-ordinating any 
significant form of international action,8 the ILO provided an alternative forum for the 
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discussion of mass unemployment and its effects, and offered the opportunity to gather and 
collate information on national and international responses to the Depression. As Alcock points 
out: 
 
 ‘if Governments, business and labour were in trouble, they needed help and they needed 
ideas, and the ILO was given the opportunity to take the initiative’.9 
 
Albert Thomas’s attempt to inspire a sense of autonomy in ILO activities proved to be critical in 
this respect. Despite the intention of the architects of the Peace Treaty to set up two 
international organisations that were constitutionally linked10, with the League as the main 
body and the ILO as part of the ‘League system’11, the ILO was quick to stress its autonomy 
both in thought and action. This it did in a number of ways.  
 
First, the key protagonist in this strategy was Albert Thomas himself who, from outset and 
through individual action and force of personality, intended to afford the ILO a sense of 
purpose and vitality that would distinguish it from the moribund political bureaucracy of the 
League. Importantly, he saw this as vital if the ILO was to establish and retain the support of 
workers, who might otherwise choose a more radical path outside the ILO framework. Workers 
needed to see hope and advantage on the international labour standards model at the heart of 
the ILO. Second, by setting up direct and independent channels of communication with the 
labour ministries, employer and worker organisations of member countries, he created a 
profile – a ‘presence’ - for the ILO, which he hoped would pay dividends in the years to come. 
Third, despite the requirement that all members of the League were automatically members of 
the ILO, Thomas believed that the provision did not preclude the right of the ILO to admit its 
own members. This was a position that challenged the constitutional links between the two 
organisations and, in particular, the senior status of the League. Notably, the ILO had already 
admitted Germany and Austria into its ranks during the first International Labour Conference in 
1919 while the League still deliberated over their status.  
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This prompted friction between the ILO and the League of Nations but the issue remained 
quiescent until Brazil left the League in 1926 but continued to remain a member of the ILO.12 
As a result, the membership of the two organisations were effectively de-coupled, paving the 
way for the ILO to be construed as an international organisation in its own right and accepted 
as a key forum for international debate on the Depression. Thus, while disillusionment with the 
League spread, the ILO became sufficiently distanced from it - institutionally and politically - for 
the international community to continue to support its activities. 
 
As the crisis deepened, inflation became the overriding factor in the economic responses of a 
number of European countries, prompting a reduction in government expenditure, tight 
controls on credit and a rise in taxation.13 In New Zealand, for example, the impetus for an 
export-led recovery was tempered by domestic concerns about increasing wage demands and 
their impact upon inflation. The onset of the Depression prompted an attack on its underlying 
causes at home. In examining policy responses to the economic crisis in both New Zealand 
and Australia, Endres and Jackson point out that, ‘Nominal wage levels were attacked in both 
countries as reaction set in to any deliberate expansion of demand either by fiscal or wage-
fixing mechanisms. The tone of policy throughout the Depression years was contractionary, 
tempered only by the fear of creating social and political upheaval’.14 
 
With the onset of economic depression, countries were beginning to shift away from policies of 
international co-operation in favour of ‘national, political and economic autism’.15 This shift was 
seen within the ILO. It led to a psychology of mutual suspicion and distrust which permeated 
the International Labour Conference and undermined its standard setting activities. Moreover, 
the Conference’s preoccupation with Europe was beginning to divide ILO members and 
become a subject of real concern for its permanent secretariat. As one conference delegate 
from New Zealand was to comment at the time: 
 
Many countries consider ratification an expression of sympathy. Several have ratified 
conventions, but passed no legislation whatever; others have done the same but 
rendered them inoperative by providing no legislation; and others have even passed 
the laws but have not carried them into effect. Countries which have ratified the eight 
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hours day convention work a ten, and in some cases a twelve hour day. The 
Continental countries distrust one another too much to carry them into effect. The 
Conference is obsessed with Europe. It is really trying to raise the standards of Eastern 
Europe to those of the West of the Continent. The South American delegates have a 
pleasant time and voted here and there, but I don’t think they do much afterwards. No 
great contribution was wanted from New Zealand, and the delegates, I found, were not 
particularly interested in us.16 
 
For his part, the New Zealand Employers delegate Shailer-Weston argued while the 
‘economies’ of sending a regular delegation to the International Labour Conference ‘were not 
sufficient’ New Zealand should keep in touch with the research and reports of the ILO: 
 
This is the most useful work to New Zealand now being carried out by the ILO. It has 
become a great clearing house for information upon all industrial and commercial 
matters. It has some very able and enthusiastic officials at its head. Moreover, 
especially as we go with Japan, China and India, and other eastern countries, it is an 
important safety valve against Bolshevistic and Communistic activities.17 
 
Worldwide, governments struggled with an economic depression without parallel in living 
memory. For New Zealand, a fall in the price of its primary exports - particularly wool, butter, 
cheese and mutton - a halt on the traditional bale-out of overseas borrowing, a drop in national 
income and the value of national production, and with the level of unemployment at an historic 
high, a period of economic and political austerity swept over the country.18 In 1933 ILO 
economist E. J. Riches was moved to write: 
 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that New Zealand is in the throes of a severe 
psychological as well as economic depression. The spectacle of a Government whose 
policy is a curious combination of drift, deflation and doubtful expediencies; the small 
results from the great expectation of Ottowa;19 the repeated failure of international 
conferences; the lack of agreement among local economists - such factors as these 
have destroyed public confidence in established leaders and led to wide-spread 
discontent. To a greater extent, perhaps, than in most other countries, the depression 
is regarded as a sort of natural calamity, a phenomenon that no amount of human 
foresight could have avoided; and to this extent the public reaction is one of resignation 
rather then constructive planning. There is a tendency, not without reason, to regard 
the causes of the depression as almost entirely international, and the possibilities of 
recovery as dependent wholly on international co-operation. Lip service to the ideals of 
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freer trade and international co-operation is, however, accompanied, as in other 
countries, by tariff, trade and currency problems of the very kind which tend to 
aggravate the world situation.20 
 
In summary, then, the inability of the League of Nations to deal with the world depression 
provided an opportunity for the ILO to offer an alternative forum for international discussion on 
the crisis. In this respect, the ability of ILO staff to gather and collate information on national 
responses to the Depression, and the determination of Albert Thomas to distance the ILO from 
the League, institutionally and politically, proved critical. If the Organisation was to retain the 
support of labour, it had to demonstrate a vitality that made the prospect of an international 
labour standards regime a real and dynamic one. The International Labour Conference 
remained were central to this process. It was the forum in which government, employer and 
labour representatives of ILO member states examined the research, debated responses and 
finally determined joint recommendations. Thomas viewed this process of interaction, 
collaboration, and tripartism, as the life-blood of the Organisation. Its function was to generate 
support for social justice and worker rights through international Conventions and 
Recommendations. Supported by research from its Geneva-based secretariat, the bulk of ILO 
activity lay here. 
 
In pursuing social justice, the radicalisation of the working class occupied the minds of political 
decision-makers throughout the industrialised world. The economic depression, and its most 
visible face - mass unemployment - became a worldwide phenomenon. The perception of 
unemployment as a breeding ground for political unrest -from the Left rather than the Right - 
prompted greater international collaboration. 
 
Attempts to distance the activities of the ILO from the League of Nations represented a 
conscious attempt to minimise the influence of these, predominantly European and strictly 
governmental, interests. If an international labour standards regime was to have any relevance 
beyond Europe, then the principles and norms of regime membership required a broader, 
more universal, significance. If tripartism between governments, employers and workers was 
the chosen framework for the regime, workers remained central in the ILO process. Unless the 
international labour standards regime developed into something that took a positive and 
proactive approach to serving these interests,  then the ILO ran the risk of isolation and 
abandonment, for it could deliver neither inclusive responses to the depression, nor, for those 
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who sought it, an antidote to communist expansion . Constructing a regime with the ILO at its 
centre operating largely independent from the League of Nations, constituted the principal 
objective of the policy of autonomy. 
 
3. Albert Thomas and the ‘Policy of Presence’ 
‘...during that unique period dating from the Berne Conference to the Washington Conference, workers, 
governments and employers believed in the possibility of creating an organisation which would be able 
to minimise the injustice, poverty and privation suffered by the great mass of wage-earners. This 
thought they had in common. The International Labour Organisation is, as it were, the outcome of that 
remarkable time. The spirit which should still animate it may have been dulled by the resumption of 
social warfare. Its powers nevertheless remain intact. Conventions embodying even a half-hearted 
justice are none the less possible. The first foundations remain firm. It was during such moments of 
intense and unanimous faith that the communes of the Middle Ages decided to build their cathedrals. 
Then, often enough, the violent, bloody struggles of party against party, class against class, would 
recommence. Yet, slowly, through the course of centuries, the cathedrals rose stone by stone, as it 
were the visible witness of that first act of faith. Similarly, on the bold plan of its first builders, the 
International Labour Organisation will also rise’.
21
 
 
A ‘Policy of Presence’, defined by regular contact with government, employer and worker 
organizations, by means of letters, Reports, Mission visits and Conferences, underpinned ILO 
activities during the 1930s. The policy had two objectives: to make the ILO ideologically 
relevant by linking its efforts to promote social justice at the international level with activities of 
social reformers and trade unions at the national level; and to maintain a profile of the ILO in 
the minds and activities of those in a position to influence public opinion. The roots of this 
approach lay in Albert Thomas’s conception of the ILO as a ‘living thing’. Subsequently, it also 
formed a fundamental aspect of Harold Butler’s attempts to bring the United States into the 
ILO fold. 
 
Albert Thomas was elected the first Director of the ILO primarily on the basis of his knowledge 
and experience of the working class and the international labour movement. This experience, 
gleaned from his years in the French Ministry of Labour, was in contrast to the civil service 
background of his rival for the Directorship, Harold Butler.22 This experience helped him to 
procure the vote of the Workers’ Group and develop an early but clear vision of the role of the 
ILO. For Thomas, the purpose of international discussion in the ILO was to promote 
improvement in labour legislation. This would be achieved, not only through the promotion of 
greater understanding of the forms of labour legislation in different countries, but also by 
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suggesting relationships between models of labour regulation, the regulation of international 
trade and competition and their outcomes 
 
An important task for the Thomas and the ILO was to persuade governments, employers and 
workers alike that there was always an international dimension to the construction of national 
labour standards - a dimension that drew on a complex mix of humanitarian, political and 
economic concerns. Moreover, it was portrayed as a dynamic process requiring dynamic, 
proactive responses. This contrasted with a strict interpretation of the articles of the Peace 
Treaty, in which the ILO was portrayed as a bureaucratic institution with no real authority and 
of diminishing relevance to a world still nervously coming to terms with changes wrought by 
war and revolution. 
 
The idea of the ILO as a procative, organic, ‘living thing’23  was given legal endorsement in 
January 1922. Following its attempts to restrict the activities of the ILO, the French 
Government appealed to the International Permanent Court of Justice for an advisory opinion 
on whether the Organisation was competent to address labour issues in the agricultural sector 
under the articles of the Treaty.24 The Court found in favour of the ILO25 and in a series of 
decisions between 1922 and 1932 Thomas’s ‘living thing’ was given substance by the principle 
of ‘unity of labour’ which the Court incorporated into its legal doctrine. It was a principle that 
was: 
 
...defined by the ILO itself in the axiom “The Organisation is labour, and nothing that 
concerns labour is alien to it”. Implicitly, the Court also confirmed Albert Thomas’s doctrine 
holding that social justice must be considered as a tendency and not a state of being. It 
thus sanctioned the notion that the competence of the ILO was an essentially dynamic 
concept, a continuing creative process.26 
 
                                                 
23
 Albert Thomas. 1921, ‘The International Labour Organisation’, p. 262. 
24
 The French government took the words industrie and industrielle from the French text of the Treaty as referring to 
manufacturing industries and argued that any interpretation of Article XIII should be confined to these industries. 
The move can be seen as a reaction to the first of the post-war crises in 1920-21 which struck an ‘economically 
depressed and politically fragile Europe’. See Ruth Henig. 1984, Versailles and After: Europe 1919-1933, London, 
Routledge, p. 37. 
25
 By examining the Littré and Oxford dictionaries the Court held that neither excluded agriculture from their 
definition of industrial pursuits and added that agriculture had been discussed openly in ILO forums since 1919 and 
at no point had its status as an industry been challenged. See Alcock, 1971, History of the ILO, pp. 53-55. 
26
 Victor-Yves Ghebali. 1989, The International Labour Organisation, p. 10. 
11 
 
The factor that moved the ILO from the bureaucratic to the organic was, for Thomas, public 
opinion.27 The First World War had shifted the issue of labour legislation to the forefront of 
national and international debate. Public opinion, prompted by national unrest and the threat of 
further war, had compelled governments to take up labour issues to their international fora. 
Within the ILO, it was recognised at an early stage that workers of the post-war world valued 
two safeguards above all: stability in daily life and security against the threat of war. From this, 
Thomas identified for the ILO a dual role - to lessen the tension within nations and to lessen 
the tension between nations. To achieve this, he had to construct an organisation that utilised 
Article XIII of the Treaty to its fullest effect. This involved broadening the ILO’s agenda beyond 
the establishment of humane conditions of work and the collection of information on the 
condition of labour, to the establishment of political, economic and moral rights for the 
individual - a doctrine which Thomas believed could give to the ILO both organisational unity 
and personality.28 Thomas understood the realpolitik in which a failure to take a positive and 
proactive approach to fulfilling worker interests would result in the political isolation of the ILO 
and its abandonment, not only by workers, but also by employers and governments already 
sceptical of the its role and achievements. For Thomas, the ILO was an organisation in which 
the pursuit of peace through social justice meant projecting forcefully worker needs into the 
realm of international relations. 
 
It was, inevitably, a high risk strategy, for international organisations were everywhere in 
retreat and the scepticism noted above was rife . For it to succeed, it had to combine two vital 
ingredients; the continuing support of the workers and active support of countries outside of 
Europe. Thomas knew that organised workers were still perceived as a threat to political 
stability by some European governments, still nervous about the Bolshevik Revolution and its 
mobilization of workers. The International Trade Union Federation, representing some 27 
million workers, had reformed in 1920 and dominated Worker representation on the ILO 
Governing Body. Its Secretary, the Dutchman, Jan Oudegeest, warned governments against 
ignoring the power of worker organisations and their role in post-war reconstruction: 
 
Formerly Governments reached their decisions without consulting the workers 
organisations. The war has shown the Governments the power of these organisations, 
a power which, properly utilised, may cement the whole economic system and 
safeguard our well-being and civilisation, but which, if neglected, will inevitably become 
a force overwhelming all others. The Supreme Council has recognised this influence by 
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its appeal to labour on behalf of the reconstruction of the world, and as the Labour 
movement has responded to this appeal, it would be dangerous to obstruct its 
collaboration in that reconstruction and to force it to choose other ways...29 
 
This threat was played on when the need arose. In the run-up to the International Labour 
Conference of 1921, mindful of French Government attempts to constrain the ILO, and 
concerned with delays in the ratification of draft conventions, Thomas raised the spectre of 
Bolshevism. On the surface, he offered both challenge and warning to all sides, particularly the 
workers whose support he so desperately needed, but the message to the European 
governments was particularly clear: 
 
...the possibility, or rather the necessity, for action appears clearly inspite of all 
opposition. Some courses are clear and certain and cannot be disregarded. Are these 
possibilities much removed from the intentions of the originators of the Organisation? 
At first sight it would seem so. In reality however it may prove otherwise. In any case 
there is an obvious connection. The application of the solemn principles laid down in 
the labour charter may yet seem far off and uncertain. As a matter of fact they are 
already beginning to be applied. To those who still doubt: to those who, having hoped, 
now anxiously wonder whether this hope was justified: to those who are tempted to 
lose faith in an organisation which has been in existence for hardly a year; the 
questions may be put: Do you know of any other methods which have proved 
effective? Have you any means of realising practically the high ideal of justice laid 
down in the Covenant of the League of Nations? Has Bolshevism, which exercises a 
powerful fascination for the masses, shown itself capable of doing anything more than 
organising a Jacobin dictatorship on the one hand, and of causing discontent and 
poverty on the other? To what constructive work can it point? Has it really secured for 
men, women and children the hours, wages and hygienic conditions provided for in the 
labour charter, or even the conditions of life which the traditions of labour legislation 
promise to the world? As a result of Bolshevism the former socialist international has 
been broken up. Its numerous fragments spend their time in discussions of principle, 
while most of the various national groups of which it is composed have not sufficient 
influence to affect legislation or state policy. Even if from the point of view of policy they 
are thinking rightly, what immediate hopes of betterment do they offer to the wage-
earners? Certainly, in spite of the internal dissension threatened by extremist 
propaganda, the great trade union federations of the industrial countries are still a living 
and essential force which makes for the development and application of international 
labour legislation.30 
 
The second ingredient, the obtaining  of support from countries outside Europe, was a 
complex task. The Governing Body of the ILO was dominated by the European powers.31 
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Taking the lead, India and South Africa protested against the eurocentric makeup of the 
Governing Body, moving a Resolution to include more countries from outside of Europe.32  In 
this challenge, it became clear that the world was changing and that, to maintain its autonomy 
and impact, the ILO had to change with it.33  For example, the post-war European economies 
were challenged by the industrial growth of the United States and Japan, two economies 
whose mere presence in international affairs symbolised the decline of the European powers. 
To survive, the ILO had to extend its reach and involve emerging nations, whilst still retaining 
the participation of European nations. The introduction in the ILO of institutional reforms 
designed to reflect the changing contours of the international political order became one 
aspect of this attempt. To understand those reforms, we need to understand how the ILO was 
able, not only to survive, but even to prosper, as the League collapsed. 
 
The World Economic Conference, convened in London in 1933 to discuss the Depression and 
reach some international agreement on how to revive the ailing world economy, was a failure. 
In particular, proposals for the restoration of a stable international monetary standard had 
been rejected by the United States. Thus, with little prospect of stable exchange rate 
arrangements, other questions requiring international agreement became impossible. As a 
result, the Conference seemed to demonstrate that attempts to solve the economic crisis 
through international co-operation were doomed. 
 
The world political situation was also deteriorating. In March 1933, the National Socialist Party, 
led by the new German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, won the German elections, having mobilised 
popular resentment against the Peace Treaty. In June, Germany stopped paying her foreign 
debts. In Italy, the National Fascist Party under Benito Mussolini began giving greater 
prominence to military expenditure as Mussolini’s belief in force and conquest found 
expression in expansionism.34 Meanwhile, in the Pacific, Japanese expansionism led to war 
with China in Manchuria.  
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The League’s failure to broker any solutions to the deteriorating global situation rendered it 
impotent. There were two dimensions to this impotency: one economic, the other political. 
Economically, the failure of the World Economic Conference resulted in nations rejecting 
international economic co-operation and instead turning inward in an effort to build their 
financial and economic strength ‘for whatever the future held in store’.35 Politically, the inability 
to reach agreement about what the League of Nations should be - policeman or arbitrator - 
resulted in a body lacking both enforcement powers and the machinery for collective security. 
The League’s efforts to control a worsening political situation ‘turned out to be not deterring 
aggressors but confusing the democracies’.36 
 
Morbid disillusionment now coloured League of Nations’ activities. As a result, the ILO was left 
to take the lead in finding international solutions to the social effects of the Depression. 
However, while the Depression and the reaction of the international community to it had a 
negative, and ultimately terminal, effect on the League of Nations it had the opposite effect on 
the ILO. Two reasons can be identified for this.  
 
First, there was the question of ILO independence from the League of Nations. The autonomy 
and freedom of action, which the ILO developed within the League system, protected it from 
the consequences of  the political decline of its parent organisation. In examining the 
exogenous evolution of the ILO, Ghebali argues that the ‘natural limits’ of the ILO within the 
League system were more budgetary rather than political. During the Depression and in light 
of the League’s decision to impose a general policy of austerity, relations between the two 
organisations became particularly tense. Beyond the question of finances, the determination of 
Albert Thomas to develop independent and direct channels of communication with 
Government, employer and trade union representatives in member countries led to the political 
and functional autonomy of the ILO becoming ‘de facto an inviolable principle’.37  
 
Second, there was the important question of United States’ membership of the ILO. As the 
political importance of the League declined, the ILO’s status increased correspondingly as the 
United States, and, soon afterwards, the Soviet Union, became members. Soviet membership 
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came about as a result of it joining the League on 18 September 1934 in an attempt to bolster 
collective security against Nazi Germany.38 Although this meant it overcame, albeit 
temporarily,39 its hostility to the ILO (a tool of capitalism), its participation in ILO affairs was 
both limited and sporadic to the extent that the Soviet Union failed to ratify a single 
international labour Convention during its period of membership.40  
 
Of more significance was the entry of the United States. Concerns over the linkage between 
the League and the ILO had been a major factor in United States reluctance to become a 
member of the ILO.41 As a result, between 1919 and 1934, Unites States policy toward the ILO 
remained subordinated to broader policy towards the League of Nations. Two factors played 
an influential role in changing this position; the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the United 
States presidency in 1932 and the impact of the Depression on the United States economy. 
The fact that the United States was no more immune to the effects of the Depression than 
other countries came as a shock to a nation which had grown prosperous and inward looking 
on the success of what Lazonick describes as the planned co-ordination of managerial 
capitalism.42 Indeed, a few years earlier and on the eve of the Great Crash of 1929, President 
Coolridge told the legislators and people of America that they could ‘regard the present with 
satisfaction and anticipate the future with optimism’.43  
 
By the end of 1933, GNP in the United States was almost one third less than in 1929, its credit 
and banking system required emergency legislation to prevent collapse and one in every four 
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of the United States’ labour force was unemployed. It was also the year in which the United 
States sent its first delegation to the International Labour Conference.44  
The dramatic downturn in domestic economic activity and its impact upon American jobs 
prompted the Roosevelt administration to examine seriously the question of ILO membership. 
Influencing this decision was the impact of competition on the increasingly precarious United 
States trade position. In 1930, Thomas sent Butler to the United States to examine its 
responses to the Depression. In December, Butler wrote: 
 
Unless I am utterly wrong, the United States has seen the end of an era ... A new 
period has already begun in which America, with her home market no longer expanding 
through immigration, an agricultural population declining owing to the competition of 
foreign produce...with her export trade dwindling on account of the tariff, will be slowly 
and painfully reduced to adapting herself to the social and political obligations which 
have been assumed by the old countries of Europe.45 
 
In the United States, the championing of the ILO by Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins46 
‘stemmed not merely from abstract humanitarian concerns’ but also from a fear that a rise in 
United States labour standards would result in a proportional rise in its labour costs and result 
in a ‘competitive trade disadvantage and an intensification of an already disastrous 
unemployment problem’.47 The debate in the ILO over the proposed Convention for a forty 
hour week caught Perkins’ attention.48 She reasoned that the adoption of such a Convention 
on a world-wide basis would be advantageous to the United States trade and employment 
situation. Moreover, the years of self-imposed isolationism had left the United States lacking in 
information about the policy interventions developed by other economies struggling with the 
Depression. United States; officials recognized that the ILO was the primary source of that 
information.  
 
In terms of the ILO’s international positioning, United States membership had become a matter 
of some urgency . The contraction of domestic economic activity in the United States had, of 
course, a fundamental impact upon the world economy. Moreover, the impact of the 
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Depression on the ILO’s Convention setting activities of the ILO was profound. Ratifications, 
which had peaked at 79 in 1928-29, began a downward spiral to 44 in 1929-30, 38 in 1930-1 
and 28 toward the end of 1933.
49
 For an organisation whose raison d’être at that point was the 
setting of international labour standards, the decline was a cause for real concern. The 
Depression was an obvious factor in this decline. More specific was the increasing reluctance 
of member states to ratify new Conventions due to the non-participation of important industrial 
competitors such as the United States and the Soviet Union.50 Another important factor was 
the political dimension to the Depression. The rise of fascism in Europe and of Japanese 
militarism in the East had dramatically increased the threat of war. Nazi Germany, second only 
to the United States in terms of the global production of iron and steel, was on the verge of 
leaving the League and the ILO. If the industrial strength of Germany stood outside the ILO, 
others might follow suit. If the United States, in particular, also eschewed ILO membership, the 
latter’s economic and political importance of the ILO would be undermined.  
 
Fortunately for the ILO, the economic costs of Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms, their impact on 
the United States trade position, the promotion and institutionalisation of trade unions under 
the proposed Wagner Act, and a more internationalist foreign economic policy,51 elicited a 
greater commitment to the possibility of United States entry into the ILO. On August 18 1934 
the United States finally accepted the invitation to join the ILO,52 providing it the political 
support it needed to survive and avoid the fate the League of Nations.  
 
4. Consolidating the ‘Policy of Presence’: The Policy of Wider 
Engagement 
When Albert Thomas died, the principles and policy foundations on which the ILO stood 
allowed Butler to introduce important, and far reaching, changes. Butler believed that 
unemployment was the worst of all social evils. He consistently emphasised in his annual 
reports to the International Labour Conference his belief that economic and financial policy 
was inseparable from social policy. Any search for a solution to mass unemployment and 
social injustice could not be conducted in isolation from other policies. For Butler, it was as 
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essential to examine the social implications of financial and economic policy as it was to 
consider the financial and economic implications of social policy. In his report to the 
International Labour Conference 1933, Butler said: 
 
‘It is now becoming more and more generally accepted that the root of the crisis lies in 
the failure of purchasing power. Unemployment breeds unemployment, because the 
fewer the number of wage earners, the fewer the number of effective consumers 
...There appears to be a growing volume of opinion in favour of making every effort to 
expend money destined for the relief of the unemployed in a manner which will provide 
them with work rather than the distribution of cash’.53 
 
Butlers’ analysis of the general political scene was acute, as was his ability to see the dangers 
and opportunities that it presented.54 In the Depression and mass unemployment, he saw the 
potential for national unrest in many economies to create the conditions for international 
conflict.55 His letters referred to an ‘increased friction between nations’ and reflected his 
frustration at the dominance of European countries in the activities of the ILO.56 In particular, 
he was aware that the United States would be reluctant to take the ILO seriously until a more 
representative group of countries were on its Governing Body.57 At a time when the standard 
setting activities of the Organisation were falling and countries were calling into question the 
relevance of ILO membership, fostering the interests of non-European states became critical. 
 
A shift in its centre of gravity away from Europe, and the ‘de-europeanisation’  of its Governing 
Body, were changes vital to the long term survival of the ILO. The Depression seemed to 
underline the decay of European powers already posed by an increase in anti-imperialist 
activity and the effects of the collapse in commodity prices on which the colonial economies 
depended. In short, the Depression marked the beginning of political and social discontent 
directed against European states, which could no longer keep together empires ‘imbued with 
an infinite complexity of producer interests’.58 The rise of fascism and an embedded fear of 
communism also added further to the corrosion of the foundations of the political institutions 
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and intellectual values of nineteenth century liberal bourgeois society.59 The implications of this 
corrosion for peace and social stability were not lost on Butler. In response, he suggested a 
radical shift in the ILO’s emphasis: 
 
‘I do not feel that we can continue to rely on Conventions as the principle test of our 
activity and progress. I think we ought to take this opportunity of shifting our centre of 
gravity, so to speak, from the purely social to the economic sphere by devoting the 
whole of our attention to the effects on the workers of the world Depression, and the 
analysis of some the principle factors from the purely industrial point of view ...The real 
issues in industry are going to be the method and extent of rationalisation, the 
necessity of high wages to maintain purchasing power, the effects of the tariff war from 
the workers point of view ...I think we should go ...and try to create a body of coherent 
thought from the labour standpoint.’60 
 
Already, South American countries had set up a regional forum of their own with the potential 
to replace the work of the ILO. Butler’s response was to devolve the ILO’s activities into more 
regional structures in an effort to develop a fairer balance between its European and non-
European members.61 In 1934, the problem of wider representation was addressed through a 
number of initiatives, including the adoption of the amendment to article 393 of the ILO 
Constitution, which increased the number of non-European countries represented on the 
Governing Body.62 
 
As noted above, as the Depression deepened, the standard setting activities of the ILO 
slowed. In response, it began to look for new approaches to dealing with its traditional 
concerns. Albert Thomas had been the first to recognise the value and importance of personal 
contact with Governments and other tripartite organisations in an effort to develop a mutual 
understanding of needs. He had seen to it that members of the Directorate visited different 
countries, made contact with leading figures of Government, employers and trade unions to 
discuss, ‘on the spot’, issues of concern.63 It was a policy which Butler followed and then 
expanded.  
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Disillusioned with the League of Nations and struggling with the economic crisis, many ILO 
members demanded services, not standards, and looked to the ILO, not as a Convention-
setting body, but as a forum with the potential to provide answers to many of the socio-
economic questions posed by the Depression. In the context of the crisis, and his own belief in 
the relevance of  ILO research activities, Butler commissioned reports, which underlined the 
importance of international action, the value of ILO membership and the role of labour 
standards in international trade. Rather than encouraging the generation of new labour 
standards, the reports underlined the importance of existing measures to regulate ‘unfair’ 
competition and stimulate international trade.  
 
Drawing on employment and productivity data from member countries, ILO economists 
produced research, which addressed policy settings for economic management and social 
progress that challenged existing orthodoxies on monetary policy, price stability and 
employment. At the heart of this thinking was the need for an internationally coordinated public 
work programmes to address the economic and social consequences of the depression.64 
Social justice was to be pursued through a policy of public investment, established through 
national public work programmes and conducted through the coordination of international 
economic policy. 
 
The positive, engaged work of the ILO contrasted with ineffectual discussions elsewhere, and 
allowed ILO activities to expand. Many of the problems faced in the global economy were 
intractable. For example, the extensive trade barriers which had grown following the First 
World War became an established part of the international economic landscape. Despite 
attempts to liberalise trade, calls for a global reduction in tariff barriers were ignored. Instead 
the world stumbled into a period of high levels of protectionism, discriminatory trade practices 
and currency blocs. What emerged was not simply a picture of domestic economic failure65 but 
the disintegration of the post war vision of international cooperation and stability. 
 
As the failure of the various world conferences to stimulate international economic cooperation 
became more apparent, optimism in the League’s future role in the revival of the international 
economic system faded. Yet while the League of Nations struggled to maintain some 
semblance of agreement on the vision of a post-Versailles peace and collective security, the 
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ILO turned its attention to addressing the economic and social consequences of the 
Depression. The ILO saw an opportunity and moved into ‘spaces’ ineffectually held by the 
League. Thus, in 1920, the newly established research department was actively inhabited by 
those with ‘economic training’ recruited from as many ILO member states as possible and from 
a wide range of institutions. In doing so, the link between economic and social considerations 
was recognised early: 
 
‘…post-war social problems no longer present themselves in the abstract simplicity which 
they sometimes assumed before the war. It is no longer possible to separate them from the 
whole economic question. …It seems certain that henceforth the continuity and efficient 
management of labour will depend on the general administration and policy of the various 
governments. … by force of circumstances [the International Labour Office] must 
necessarily touch on the whole social and economic question’.66 
 
The ILO’s advocacy of the international coordination of public work programmes was 
supplemented by research on the social consequences of the depression, by the publication of 
data from member states on employment, and the submission of field studies from ILO 
economists on domestic efforts to deal with the downturn in world economic activity. This 
conscious strategy of establishing a engaged ‘presence’ in domestic and international activity 
articulated itself in ILO research. Its unrivalled repository of data on domestic economic activity 
gathered and analysed during the depression established the ILO as the key international 
organisation for economic thought and policy responses in the inter-war period. It extended 
and transformed the meaning of ‘public investment’ to apply to any governmental activity 
designed for industrial development and established public works policy as an accepted 
instrument in stimulating economic activity.67 
 
5. Conclusions: An Overview of the Period 
Throughout the inter-war period, the world beyond Europe was growing in importance 
economically and politically. Both Thomas and Butler recognised that in order to survive, the 
ILO had to reflect this change. They attached great importance to the task of building an 
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organisation that had universal relevance. This required a rebalancing of ILO emphases away 
from European nations. Following the death of Thomas in 1932, Butler made that rebalancing 
a priority in his work. A significant factor in this respect was the entry of the United States into 
the ILO. Butler knew that once the United States became a member, European dominance 
would be broken, changes in the underlying structure of power would become more visible, 
and broader, more inclusive international coalitions would gradually emerge. As a result, he 
worked hard to make United States membership a reality.68 
 
Through a mixture of political shrewdness and tenacity on the part of Thomas, and Butler’s 
capacity to interpret change and nuance in the wider political terrain, the Director General of 
the ILO came to occupy an eminent international position, in many respects more important 
than the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The position was able to influence the 
course of action of the ILO to a far greater extent than its counterpart in the League. The vision 
of the ILO as a ‘living thing’ with an autonomy giving it the freedom to engage with workers all 
over the world, created an impetus to action, over and above data collection and analysis.  
The ability to use this information proactively -  to influence national policy, to develop 
international labour legislation and to bring the United States into its fold - proved vital in first 
developing and then shifting the ILO’s ‘centre of gravity’.  Butler’s objective was to create of 
‘body of thought’ which made explicit the linkage between trade and labour standards and 
underline the economic as well as the social role of international labour legislation.  
 
In tune with this, government support for the ILO in countries like the United States was 
mobilised around agendas of political change, economic recuperation and the need for 
international co-operation to mitigate the full effects of the Depression. Labour, for its part, 
while sympathetic to activities promoting the role of the ILO, continued to organise around 
worker rights and the broader theme of social justice. However, a view was emerging that 
most of labour’s original demands of the ILO had been achieved - a point being expressed 
openly by those who had assisted in the founding of the ILO and who agreed with the social 
logic of its development.69  
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By 1933, most industrialised countries had legislated to provide the eight hour day, weekly 
days of rest, equal pay for equal work, workplace safety inspections and limit child labour. With 
the onset of mass unemployment and diminishing export revenues, governments had to be 
convinced that it lay in their economic interests to continue the ratification of international 
labour standards. Indeed, the priority to be attached to labour standards in a period of 
economic turmoil became less clear. This reinforced the lesser significance given to standards 
setting, whilst in no way reducing the political concern about radical mobilization of the working 
class. The shift promoted by Butler represented a pragmatic understanding that state-led 
action to reverse the impacts of the Depression and renew growth had to be a primary focus 
for ILO activity. In this, the answer to radicalization of labour was understood to be improved 
employment prospects, rather than extended labour standards That understanding is 
fundamental to the strategy of engagement across social and economic policy ate the heart of 
the Butler approach. 
 
Butler’s belief that the United States held the key to the long term survival of the ILO remained 
at the heart of his activities. He reasoned that apart from the weight which the western world’s 
leading industrial power carried in the decision-making of an international organisation, United 
States membership would add a vitality to counter the diminishing interest of the European 
powers in the ILO. In 1922, Butler described international co-operation as a ‘feeble infant’70 
and nothing in the 1930s had moved him to change that view. 
 
While the objective of the ILO remained the development of an international labour standards 
regime, the economic realities of the Depression prompted a shift in the ILO’s traditional focus. 
Under Albert Thomas the ILO focused on labour and social justice. Under Harold Butler, the 
ILO faced a worldwide economic depression, stagnation in the ratification of international 
labour standards, increasing unrest among non-European members, and the proposal by 
some regions to establish their own labour organisations. All posed serious threats to the 
continuing existence and development of the fledgling ILO. In response, Harold Butler shifted 
the ILO’s focus to the relationship between economic and social policy. It became a repository 
for economic data submitted to Geneva by member countries (often following persistent 
cajoling from ILO personnel) and an advocate of new economic thinking that challenged 
orthodox policies on matters of global depression and recovery. The value of this research 
activity was not lost on key economies  
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United States isolationism ended when it recognised the value of promoting labour legislation 
on an international scale so as not to disadvantage American industry in the wake of 
Roosevelt’s social and economic reforms under the New Deal. The ILO used the entry of the 
United States as a lever to break the dominance of the European powers and shift its centre of 
gravity from Europe to the American continent.  It was a recognition that the world beyond 
Europe was growing in importance economically and politically. Butler recognised that in order 
to survive the ILO had to reflect this change. He attached great importance to the task of 
building an organisation that had universal and not just European relevance and made the 
task a priority of his office. Butler knew that once the United States became an ILO member, 
European dominance would be broken, changes in the underlying structure of power would 
become more visible, and broader, more inclusive international coalitions would gradually 
emerge. As a result, he worked hard to make United States membership a reality.71  
 
 In the event, the spread of German and Italian aggression in Europe and Japanese 
imperialism in the East moved the world’s industrial economies onto a war footing. The 
expansion in productivity as the world armed itself shifted the chaos from economic 
depression to total war. During the fighting, the ILO began to focus its energies on the twin 
tasks of organisational survival and the development of post-war reconstruction. The outbreak 
of war moved the ILO further from the dominance of the European powers and closer to the 
influence of the United States. It was an influence that was to prove critical to the ILO’s plans 
for post-war reconstruction and significant in light of new questions concerning the relevance 
of international labour standards to the post-war world. 
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